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Both large and small-scale producers continue to operate in aquaculture, even if
frequently the economic pressures on small fish farmers are immense and some
branches of aquaculture (such as salmon rearing) have tended to organise on an
ever-larger scale. How small producers have survived in Irish rope mussel aquaculture
is the question posed in this paper. Based on 18 months of ethnographic study in
the West of Ireland’s Killary Harbour, the contribution that formal and informal
cooperation has made to the persistence of small-scale mussel production is
assessed. Although formal and informal forms of cooperation are by no means the
only conditions of the persistence of small-scale production in the Killary site, they
are shown to have critically improved the survival chances of individual producers
and of groups of producers. What is also shown is that informal cooperation has
significantly eclipsed formal cooperation since 2000.
Keywords: Small-scale aquaculture; Rope mussel farming; Cooperation; Cooperatives;
Survival strategy; Killary Harbour; The West of IrelandIntroduction
Aquaculture production has grown significantly in the last decade and now comprises
approximately 50% of the world’s supply of consumable fish (FAO 2012). Currently
aquaculture is estimated to employ 23.4 million persons worldwide and is seen as an
increasingly valuable food source for a dramatically enlarged global population (Valderrama
et al. 2010). The expansionist tendency of capitalism might suggest a continual
concentration of capital in aquaculture, and such a tendency is evident in salmon farm-
ing in Ireland and elsewhere. Within the sector, however, both large and small pro-
ducers continue to exist and by no means does small-scale production look like
disappearing in the near future. In addition to the element of local control, what distin-
guishes small-scale aquaculture is the use of relatively small in-shore boats, low-cost
farming technologies, limited amounts of capital investment and a heavy dependence
on the producer’s own labour and that of family members (FAO Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations 2012).
Irish aquaculture can be viewed as having developed along two diverging paths. The
first path, in keeping with capitalism’s expansionist tendency, has seen aquaculture de-
velop along large-scale lines. Salmon farming, where a relatively small number of highly
capitalised producers have historically dominated the industry (Phyne 2010; Ruddy and
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distinctive for being small in scale.
This paper will explore the micro politics of survival among the small-scale fish
farmers of Killary Harbour, one of Ireland’s largest mussel-farming sites, by considering
in particular the respective contributions of formal and informal cooperation to the
ability of small producers to survive.Four sets of survival conditions
Four sets of conditions can be seen as important to the survival chances of small-scale nat-
ural resource enterprises. In the first of these, the focus falls squarely on economic consid-
erations. The contention of Mann and Dickinson (1979) is that the reluctance of capitalists
to invest in production agriculture reflects the length of the production cycle, the high pro-
duction risks and difficulties relating to labour supervision. While intensive salmon farming
can and has overcome these limitations in Ireland (Ruddy and Varley 1991: 78), the same is
much less true of that branch of aquaculture that uses a rope technology to farm
phytoplankton-feeding mussels. An early study suggested that the lower profit margins in
mussel farming had helped restrict external capital investment penetrating the industry in
north Connemara’s Killary site (Ruddy and Varley 1991: 78), thus allowing local people with
access to but small amounts of capital to become fish farmers. The seasonal nature of
much farming activity and the heavy reliance on temporary as against permanent labour
have been taken as other important reasons why rationally organised and capital-intensive
farming departs from ‘the norms of industrial capitalism’ (Worsley 1984: 160).
It is on the household that the second set of conditions focuses its attention. Especially
under the influence of the Russian agronomist, A. V. Chayanov, much importance has been
accorded to the deployment of household labour, and to the willingness of household
members to endure high levels of self-exploitation, in order to secure household survival.
By now an immense literature, much of it informed by Chayanov’s ideas about peasant
rationality, has accumulated around the topic of the production practices small-scale natural
resource producers have devised to improve their survival chances (Van der Ploeg 2013).
Household-based production practices may also count for much when economic diver-
sification occurs. Thus Menzies’ (2003) study of small and medium-scale commercial fish-
ing in the Bigouden region of France shows that many families in diversifying from
agriculture into fishing relied on the self-same household arrangements of deploying family
labour that sustained peasant farming (2003: 75–76). Critically, reliance upon a supply
of unpaid family labour removed paid labour costs from the production process at a time
when the diversifying farmer-fishers faced testing economic challenges.
A third set of conditions points to the importance of the state in regulating the eco-
nomic environment in which production occurs and in stimulating small-scale enterprise.
Thus Phyne (2010: 1), in accounting for how small-scale aquaculture continues to persist
internationally and in spite of a strong underlying trend for food production to increase
progressively in scale, points to the significance of strong national state policies that help
buffer local regions from the advance of neo-liberal economic forces and the concentra-
tion of capital at the expense of small-scale producers (see also Curtin and Varley 1991).
From being a fledgling industry in the 1970s, fish farming in Ireland has, under state
stimulation, steadily developed to make an important economic impact to coastal rural
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Ireland’s remote and economically disadvantaged western seaboard (MERC 2008: 5). The
total value of Irish aquaculture was estimated at €124.6 million in 2007 when 2,058 persons
found employment in the industry (MERC Consultants 2008: 2).
The fourth set of conditions, the one we wish to explore here, stresses the importance
of ‘cooperation’ to the survival chances of small-scale producers. Our discussion will
distinguish between formal cooperation, found within formally organised cooperatives,
and the informal cooperation to be found outside them.
The most general process that underlies formal cooperative activity is the pooling of
resources by a membership (Esman and Uphoff 1984: 62). Thus, members of a fish-
farming cooperative pool their savings and labour power or capacity to work. Less obvi-
ously, normative expectations relating to trust and reciprocity between friends and
neighbours may be pooled in both the formal and informal forms of cooperation. Typ-
ically individuals carry such normative expectations with them into formally or infor-
mally organised instances of cooperation from the wider society in which they live.
Besides the phenomenon of pooling in all its dimensions, formal cooperatives have
been seen as normatively structured around three basic principles. These stipulate that
it is ‘the users of a co-operative who are supposed to own, control and enjoy the bene-
fits of the business’ (Ward 2000: 26). To the extent that these principles operate in
practice, ownership and control of a cooperative become vested in user-members rather
than anonymous or known investors. And, where benefits are concerned, servicing the
needs of a membership takes precedence over profit maximization.
The ability of formal cooperation to boost the survival chances of small-scale enterprise
has long been recognised. Max Weber (1991 [1906] : 367–8) observed how cooperative
credit provision and marketing among small farmers, by allowing them benefit from econ-
omies of scale, could do much to offset the market disadvantages that came from being
small. For over a century Denmark has provided an exemplary case of cooperative
organization becoming an important means of securing the survival of commercial small-
holders (Manniche 1952; Chloupkova et al. 2003). In more recent times, Menzies’ (1993)
study of British Columbia also highlights the crucial role of local cooperatives in facilitating
family fishers to share capital, knowledge and labour with others in the fishing community.
Why might individuals choose to cooperate? Some have emphasised the importance
of relationships involving trust, and expectations pertaining to reciprocal exchange, as
the normative foundations of cooperation (see Wolf 1966). Thus Ostrom (2010) sug-
gests that cooperation will not succeed without the ability of the relevant parties to
trust each other. The importance of instrumental reasons has also been highlighted.
Here the suggestion is that producers see cooperation, and the reciprocal sharing of
resources, as the most rational option available to them in the context of their own
specific circumstances (Popkin 1979; Stone and Potsdam 1996; Wolf 1966).Mussel farming in killary harbour
While the four sets of survival conditions outlined above are all relevant to varying de-
grees, this paper will explore the possibility that both formal and informal cooperation
has been especially significant in small-scale aquaculture’s struggle to survive in Killary
Harbour. Cooperation has been a central element of the two phases of development
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of these phases saw the prospective fish farmers set up their own cooperative with a
view to sharing costs, physical resources, labour and knowledge. The decision of a
number of the mussel producers to break away from the cooperative marked the begin-
ning of a second developmental phase in the Killary. These breakaway producers ex-
panded the physical size of their sea farms, thus acquiring a greater segment of the area
available for mussel farming than that controlled by the cooperative. They also began
to employ local youths as hired labour. Leaving the cooperative, however, did not mark
the end of cooperation among the breakaway mussel producers. Very soon, in response
to the difficulties encountered outside the cooperative, new informal forms of cooper-
ation began to appear among pairs of the breakaway mussel farmers.
Currently the Killary mussel-farming site (Figure 1) supports the part-time employ-
ment of 23 persons, thirteen owner-operators and ten hired workers temporarily employed
at key points in the production cycle. The mussel owner-farmers may rely on aquaculture
as the primary strand of their household incomes, but they also supplement their sea-
farming earnings with employment in small-scale agriculture, in construction, small-scale
inshore fishing, in tourism and in factories. Sea farming in Killary Harbour succeeded in
harvesting mussels valued at €1.29 million in 2007.
To proceed, we will begin by outlining the methodology used in the study. Then we will
examine the place of formal cooperation in the early days of establishing mussel farming
in the Killary, how mussel aquaculture developed over time and why a number of pro-
ducers decided to break away from the cooperative. The effects on the cooperative of the
loss of members will be assessed, as will be the importance of informal cooperation to the
survival of the breakaway producers.Figure 1 Killary harbour.
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Our data are chiefly derived from eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork among the
mussel farmers of Killary Harbour. Relying on the techniques of participant observation,
the senior author repeatedly observed the mussel farmers at work; and conversed with all
thirteen of the current owner-operators (see Cush 2012). He further became acquainted
with the ten temporary wage-labourers employed by some of the producers. So as to
cover the full range of work practices, these observations and conversations took place at
different points across the 18-month mussel production cycle. Observations and conver-
sations were supplemented with more formal semi-structured interviews with the pro-
ducers (all given pseudonyms here); and these permitted the verification or discounting of
some initial observations. Seven former producers, who have since moved away from the
industry, were also interviewed. All these interviews yielded valuable insights into the con-
tribution of formal and informal cooperation to small-scale aquaculture’s survival during
the industry’s development over a 30-year period.
Secondary sources were also consulted. Among these were state reports, the cooperative’s
files, and press accounts of Killary mussel farming. Besides the data’s own inherent value, it
was also of use in helping to jog the mussel farmers’ memories of important events in the
development of the industry.
As it was clear from an earlier ‘baseline’ study that a number of state agencies and
agents had played a decisive role in initiating and stimulating formal cooperation in the
Killary site (Ruddy and Varley 1991), a number of state personnel were either commu-
nicated with or interviewed. These individuals worked for such bodies as Bord Iascaigh
Mhara (BIM, Ireland’s Sea Fisheries Board), the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food (Aquaculture Licensing Division), The Combat Poverty Agency of Ireland
(CPA), The National Board of Science and Technology (NBST) and the local develop-
ment company in northwest Connemara, FORUM.
In the process of collecting and analysing the data, it became clear that Killary mussel
farming could be divided into two distinct developmental phases. The first phase, in
which the cooperative was the central player, lasted from 1980–2000. The second
phase, which still continues, commenced in 2000 when five cooperative members broke
away to function independently. Two of the breakaway farmers teamed up with other
local individuals in 2000 to set up joint enterprises, thus increasing the number of inde-
pendent owner-operators in Killary to seven.
What follows then is an in-depth account of these two developmental phases with a
view to assessing the contribution of formal and informal cooperation to the persist-
ence of small-scale mussel production in the Killary site.First phase: the killary fish farming cooperative (1980–2000)
Mussel farming in the Killary began in the early 1970s after a young marine biologist
discovered that the bay was rich in the phytoplankton that mussels feed on. The bay
was additionally favoured by having good shelter from storms developing in the north-
eastern Atlantic, and the water temperature was ideal for growing mussels efficiently.
Subsequently Beirtreach Teoranta (BT), a subsidiary of the commercial state-sponsored
company Gaeltarra Éireann, commenced experiments with suspended mussel culture
in the Killary. The results were sufficiently encouraging to prompt BT to embark on
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ance in 1980, local north Connemara community councils had commenced negotia-
tions with a number of statutory and voluntary agencies with a view to achieving local
participation in aquaculture. Such talks proved to be protracted (over 100 meetings
were held between 1975 and 1980), frustrating and ultimately inconclusive (O’Donohue
1982). Eventually BT agreed to supply mussel culture information to local persons in-
terested in starting their own mussel farms. At this point, however, BT was itself mov-
ing toward commercial production and therefore tended to view other would-be
mussel farmers as competitors.
Although developments in the 1970s convinced local interests that aquaculture had
great promise, the young marine biologist, now employed by the NBST and living lo-
cally, would have a major input into the form local shellfish aquaculture would assume
in the Killary site. His belief was that both the Killary and its surrounding communities
would benefit most by adopting a small-scale and low-cost approach. Maximising local
participation and ensuring local control of the resource were central elements of the
developmental model he advocated. With no significant barriers to entry, he believed
that local people could relatively easily set up in the industry, and that the income
earned would make an appreciable difference in what was a remote and economically
and socially declining district of the far west of Ireland (Interview: NBST biologist, 16/
3/10).
The biologist then began to approach a number of state and local development agen-
cies with a view to getting them to promote the small-scale model of mussel farming.
Eventually, these agencies accepted that mussel farming as conceived by the NBST
biologist did indeed promise to be a significant source of local employment (Interview:
NBST biologist, 16/3/10). A training programme, run by the NBST in conjunction with
BIM, the Department of Fisheries, the CPA, and a number of local development agen-
cies, was launched in 1979 and local people were encouraged to take part. The trainees
learned about the biology of the mussel, the mussel growing cycle, the construction of
rafts and long-lines, the available grants, licensing requirements and the principles of
business organisation. In the course of the training programme it was suggested by
BIM, NBST and CPA personnel that those interested in mussel farming should consider
setting up a cooperative, as this would permit them to significantly reduce their costs
and facilitate their individual and collective survival in the industry (Herriot 1980).
Out of the 1979 training programme emerged a group of 15 men from the communities
surrounding the Killary who, for reasons relating to costs and benefits, could see much
merit in the idea of forming a cooperative. Even with the set-up costs being relatively low,
they still represented a significant obstacle for the individuals involved. Acquiring a proper
boat would be particularly costly. A cooperative would allow them to share costs and as a
result significantly reduce them (Interview: Joe, former cooperative member, 25/5/10).
Something else in the cooperative’s favour, as proposed by the marine biologist and other
state functionaries, was that it would take full responsibility for marketing the mussels, thus
allowing the producers to concentrate on the production side of sea farming (Interview:
Ollie, cooperative member, 12/9/09). On the strength of such considerations, the 15
individuals decided to form the Killary Fish Farming Cooperative.
In the initial stages BIM, NBST and the CPA assisted the producers in purchasing
farming gear and developing their farms, and in imparting knowledge about mussel
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personnel provided on financing and marketing, areas where the local men lacked the
necessary experience, was also crucial in getting the cooperative off to a good start
(Interview: CPA officer, 15/10/09).
The NBST biologist worked out that initial investments per head would amount to
Irl£750 on rafts and Irl£1,000 over the full 18 months it takes to grow mussels to a
commercial size. His advice was that the cooperative should avoid investing in a
customised mussel boat at first; instead, the producers could use their own half-deckers
and currachs (west of Ireland rowing boats that nowadays are typically fitted with out-
board engines). The biologist’s estimation was that over the first 18-month growing
cycle each farmer would produce approximately three to four tonnes of mussels, with
sales amounting to Irl£1,500 per head. If these targets were reached, producers would
be able to pay off the capital costs of their rafts, and even break even after the first
growing cycle. The anticipated profits to be made in the second growing cycle could
then be re-invested in purchasing more rafts and long-lines, thus allowing each mussel
farmer to develop and grow his output. So as to ensure that the cooperative would
cover its running costs, it was agreed that each member would contribute ten percent
of their annual sales to the common pool (Herriot 1980).
The advice of the NBST biologist was that decision-making in the cooperative should
be consensual. And even though a secretary would have to be employed to look after
bookkeeping and marketing, he stressed the importance of membership control with
everyone being actively engaged and having a real say in the cooperative’s affairs. Apart
from the valued democratic aspect, active engagement would encourage individuals to
see the system as fair and as worth committing themselves to. Another of the biologist’s
recommendations was that the cooperative should concentrate on producing high qual-
ity shellfish and selling to the French fresh market where prices are higher than those
commanded by canned or processed mussels (Interview NBST biologist: 12/2/10).
Although the NBST biologist was personally respected and his suggestions and those
of other state functionaries regarding the cooperative taken very seriously, the endorse-
ment of his suggestions by two especially influential cooperative members proved de-
cisive (Interviews: NBST biologist 16/3/10 and CPA officer 15/10/09). Their fellow
cooperative members regarded these two individuals as natural or ‘born’ leaders who
commanded great respect in the wider community. Comments such as “them lads are
smart men, so we always listened to them” (Interview, Liam, cooperative member 19/9/
09), and “they were always good organisers and had a good head for numbers” (Inter-
view Jack, cooperative member: 12/2/10), testify to the sort of influence these two men
could wield. At the beginning such influence was quite crucial given the unprecedented
character of the enterprise being embarked on (Interview: Ollie, cooperative member
15/4/10). And subsequently while decision-making within the cooperative remained
consensual, the presence of the two influential men meant that the cooperative was not
lacking in strong leadership.
A substantial grant of Irl£35,000 from the Youth Employment Agency (YEA) permit-
ted the cooperative to purchase its first customised mussel boat in 1984. The mussel
farmers used this acquisition to expand output and free themselves from total reliance
on the half-deckers and currachs they had been using up to then. So as to cover future
running costs, the cooperative purchased a number of rafts in its own name at this
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farmers. These two men would in time replace three of the original producers
prevented by other employment from committing themselves more fully to sea farming.
In 1985, BT’s assets were sold off after it had gone into liquidation, and cooperative
members further added to their capital assets by pooling their savings and borrowings
to purchase some of BT’s Killary rafts. As the rafts were to be sold in large lots, the co-
operative members could hope to purchase them only by joining together as buyers.
Once purchased, the rafts were then divided up amongst the members in proportion to
each individual’s investment (Interview: Tim, former cooperative member, 10/2/10).
On the back of these developments, each member had a fully developed 4-hectare
farm by 1990, and a potential annual harvest of 80 tonnes of mussels. As it happened,
no one at first reached this potential, as all the producers had other work commit-
ments that left mussel-farming as a subsidiary, albeit highly significant, income
source. While seven of the mussel farmers were producing approximately 60 tonnes
at this time, the other eight, with less time available to devote to their sea farms, were
harvesting approximately 20 tonnes (Interviews, mussel farmers: 1/09/09 – 1/1/11).
The overall production trend was nonetheless strongly upwards and, by 1990, ap-
proximately 600 tonnes of mussels were harvested, compared to the 60 tonnes pro-
duced in 1981. As output increased, the cooperative’s ten percent levy on each tonne
of produce – subsequently changed to €100 a tonne - left it well positioned to cover
its costs and modernise its equipment.
A notable development occurred in 1990 when a cooperative member left the Killary
area for personal reasons and sold his farm to an outsider who had recently settled in
the area. This man (Manus), who made no secret of his intention to expand beyond the
4-hectare limit, had his application for membership of the cooperative turned down.
He then applied and was granted permission by the state licensing authority to double
the size of his mussel farm. Subsequently, he applied for and was given a further
increase that brought the size of his mussel-farming operations to 18.55 hectares. The
appearance of Manus in the Killary is significant for the reasons that, from the outset,
he adopted an expansionist capitalist approach to mussel production and opted to rely
heavily on hired labour.
Manus’s expansionist approach contrasts strikingly with the cooperative’s equalitarian
insistence on capping production at four hectares per mussel farm. This four hectare
limit was again decided on NBST advice that such a practice would help conserve and
divide evenly the Killary’s finite supply of phytoplankton (Joe, former cooperative mem-
ber: 11/2/10). Another consideration in the size rule’s adoption was bound up with no-
tions of adequacy, sufficiency and being content with achieving a ‘modest livelihood’
(Liam, former cooperative member: 17/08/10). Here the reasoning was that a four-
hectare farm, even allowing for the cooperative’s ten percent levy, would give each sea
farmer access to a valuable strand of household income. Such a farm size was estimated
as capable of yielding 70 tonnes of mussels per year and so achieving (at current prices)
an annual profit of €43,000 (Interviews with mussel farmers, Joe (12/3/10), Billy (13/
11/09), Liam (12/4/10), and Mark (19/10/10)).
Besides significantly reducing the individual farmer’s capital costs, the cooperative
also had the advantage of functioning in a way that reduced labour costs. This was so
as long as the members were willing to pool their labour power. Typically individuals
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harvesting times relied heavily on the assistance of others. To sell in the premium fresh
market the producers had to harvest and clean the mussels by hand as the French
buyers were very strict on quality. If they were to fill big orders on time - up to seven
tonnes a day - producers saw that they had no real option but to pool and share their
labour power on a reciprocal basis. The widespread practice of the reciprocal exchange
of labour within the cooperative meant that the hiring of wage labour (apart from one
case where a mussel farmer regularly employed a helper) was almost entirely absent.
Over the years much of this reciprocity has endured, and ethnographic observation
testifies to its continuing strength today.
Alongside the four-hectare size rule and the initially 10 per cent sales levy, there was
also an informal acceptance within the cooperative that each member be given an equal
share of the market. At times of peak demand, when orders of 20 tonnes per week had
to be filled, the cooperative would strive therefore to ensure that each person had an
equal chance to sell his harvestable stock. Typically, no one took unfair advantage of
this arrangement, though normally some preference was given to those mussel farmers
whose ropes were particularly heavily laden and therefore at risk of losing significant
quantities of mussels to winter storms (Interview: cooperative members Ollie 16/3/10
and Mark 15/2/10).
Another informal practice was to allow each member equal access to the coopera-
tive’s customised boat and gear on a rotational basis. The two influential leaders con-
tinually stressed the importance of staying together and abiding by the rotational
system. Underpinning this and the other informal practices of the cooperative was a
combination of a sense of rational pragmatism and feelings of trust between members.
This climate of trust was both reflected in and reinforced by the way all the cooperative
members became friends as well as work colleagues. The following observation points
to the importance of the sense of trust that came of strong friendship ties:
You will not find any formal conflict resolution systems in the coop. It never came
down to it. Any rules we decided on were done out of a consensus. Often people
would have come with their own individual demands and sometimes they may have
been in conflict with each other. But we always sort them out amongst ourselves and
the co-op would come to a collective agreement. We were all friends and we trusted
each other so we never needed a formal system of rules (Interview, Ollie, 14/4/10;
also Interviews Bobby 16/5/10, Joe 15/5/10 and Mark 19/9/10).
The strength of trust and friendship between the cooperative’s members was evidenced
during the working day in the amount of camaraderie, banter, joking and ‘slaging’ (teasing)
that permeated interaction among the sea farmers. As one mussel farmer remarked: “if you
can’t slag a man, you don’t really know him”. These different expressions of light-
heartedness, besides helping to structure working relationships, contributed to passing the
time and to making the working day more enjoyable.
In the early years, cooperative members viewed mussel farming as but one among
several other strands of household income. Most of the members worked as small
farmers, in inshore fishing and in boat repair. Others worked in local adventure cen-
tres as tour guides or as outdoor adventure instructors. Mussel production, as we
have seen, was nonetheless expanding its output in Killary. As such, it increasingly
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they had been raised in and desired to stay in (Interviews with cooperative members:
1/09/09-1/1/11). One of the cooperative’s informal leaders spoke for the others when
he observed:
Our main focus in the coop was to provide a livelihood and to keep our families
going. All we wanted was to live in the beautiful place that we were brought up in
and not be forced to emigrate to Dublin or England or somewhere. It may not have
been an extravagant living but we weren’t scrapping along either. We were providing
a modest living for our families, not a whole pile wrong with that, is there?
(Interview: Joe, 5/6/10)
From 1979 mussel farming in Killary was increasingly conceived locally as a
community-based (even if heavily state-assisted at first) and small-scale form of eco-
nomic activity. The idea of having an industry controlled by outside interests (such as
BT up to 1986), and benefiting mainly outside interests to the exclusion of local people,
became more objectionable (Interview, NBST biologist 16/3/10 and CPA officer 15/10/
09). Only by throwing the industry open to local participation, it was contended, could
local community interests hope to help address the root cause of the rural poverty and
out-migration that North West Connemara had long suffered under (Forum 2008).
Equality and reciprocity, as institutionalised in the four-hectare rule and in the practice
of sharing knowledge, equipment and labour, were the critical organising principles
upon which the cooperative chose to build its model of small-scale mussel farming.
The practice of cooperation can be seen as a learning process that involved the deploy-
ment of these organisation principles, and that had the effect of crucially facilitating the
survival of the individual mussel farms on the basis of a controlled and modest growth
of output. In the second phase of development of small-scale mussel production in the
Killary, now to be discussed, many of the core assumption that underpinned the coop-
erative’s approach came to be challenged.Second phase: the cooperative under challenge (2000–2012)
In 2000, five producers left the Killary Fish Farming Cooperative as they wished to ex-
pand their mussel farms beyond the cooperative’s four-hectare limit. Three of the
breakaway sea farmers were young and newly married, with mortgages to service and
young families to maintain, and it appears that their decision to break with the co-
operative was motivated by their personal circumstances. In addition, the five break-
away producers were partly inspired by the example of Manus who had never
recognised the four-hectare rule and who apparently was operating successfully as an
independent producer.
All five of the breakaway individuals would accept that the cooperative had served a
vital purpose in the early years in getting locals mussel farming started and in putting it
on a secure footing that allowed the individual producers to survive at a certain level.
By 2000, however, they had come to believe that not only had a defining aspect of the
cooperative’s approach outlived its usefulness for them personally, but also that they
were being damagingly constrained in developing their farms further by abiding by the
four-hectare size rule.
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lem faced by the cooperative in 2000. On top of this, a number of the cooperative’s pro-
ducers were growing too old to farm mussels and gradually began to disengage, thus
eventually leaving but six current members in the cooperative, as compared to the
starting fifteen. Three of these are veterans of the original group who formed the
cooperative in 1980, and three others are young local newcomers who have joined the
cooperative and been trained by it as mussel farmers.
This six-member group is still committed to the original developmental approach revolv-
ing around the cooperative and area-restricted small-scale production. As of old, costs,
equipment and labour are pooled and shared among the cooperative’s membership (Inter-
views with current cooperative members and ethnographic observations: 1/9/09 – 1/1/11).
Each member continues to supplement part-time mussel farming earnings with other in-
come sources. There are now a part-time electrician, two sheep farmers, two adventure
centre employees and a social welfare recipient. One of the influential veteran leaders of
the cooperative, the current secretary, continues to play a ‘big brother’ role when important
decisions come up. Among the reduced membership, the view that the cooperative still
provides the best means of achieving individual and collective survival remains strong.
The five breakaway producers who left to pursue a go-it-alone strategy in 2000 ac-
quired, by virtue of expanding beyond the cooperative’s four-hectare size limit, a larger
slice of Killary’s mussel-farming water. Compared to the 34.5 hectares (29%) currently
in the hands of the cooperative and its members, the breakaway producers occupy 86
hectares (71%) of the mussel farming water. The average size of the breakaway farms is
17.2 hectares; and these farms range in size from 12.4 to 24.75 hectares.
While the four-hectare model allowed each of the cooperative members to produce in
the region of 60 to 80 tonnes of mussels yearly, the five breakaway producers are producing
between 250 and 300 tonnes per year on their expanded farms (Interviews with breakaway
producers: 1/9/09 – 1/1/11). To work their bigger farms, the breakaway producers have
purchased their own private boats and hired in wage labour at harvesting times.
Only one of the five breakaway producers chose to run his business solely on his
own. Predictably, he could manage only by using local wage labour on a year round
basis. In recent years this man has substantially disengaged from the industry. All of
the others have formed partnerships of various kinds. One of the breakaway producers
formed a business partnership with an old friend who wanted to involve himself in
mussel farming. This newcomer, as well as contributing physical labour, attends to the
marketing and bookkeeping sides of the business. Manus and another breakaway pro-
ducer brought their wives into their expanded enterprises. Another teamed up with his
brother as joint owners of the business. Interestingly, in spite of expanding their farms,
all of the breakaway producers continue to retain secondary sources of paid work in
construction, agriculture, sheep-farming and part-time fishing.
Despite the rather substantial increase in farm size, the breakaway farmers still see
mussel production in Killary as relatively small in scale by virtue of its relatively low levels
of capital and technological investment. Furthermore, they point to how production has
remained in the hands of local households (with the exception of Manus) rather than
large companies from outside the district.
Nor has cooperation disappeared outside the cooperative. While all the breakaway
producers rely heavily on their own labour and on hired labour (at busy times), they
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mussel producers in the bay. In the cases where wives have become involved in mussel
farming (Manus has to be included here as well), we see new forms of cooperation
within families emerging. The division of labour here sees the men looking after day-to-
day maintenance at sea and the harvesting of the mussels, and the women concentrat-
ing on sales and marketing (Interview individual producers: 16/2/10 and 22/3/10). One
of the other producers, as we have seen, shares the workload with his brother. Both of
these men work side by side on shore and sea and also in sourcing markets. As one of
the brothers is better at book keeping, he looks after that side of the enterprise. The
brothers try to keep their partnership secure by achieving an even spread of work and
benefits (Interviews: 10/5/10).
Even though one of the other partnerships is not built upon kinship ties, the two in-
dividuals concerned have been close friends since childhood. The newcomer in this
case drifted into mussel farming after having started a family and finding himself un-
able to provide for them through sheep farming alone. Again, the two men seek to
share the production and harvesting workload evenly, although the one with the better
“business head” looks after the bookkeeping and the sourcing of markets (Interview: In-
dividual producers: 10/11/10). With no kin or friends involved in the business, the one
breakaway farmer who runs a sole business is obliged to hire wage labour the year
round.
While still within the cooperative, the breakaway farmers could depend on reciprocated
labour to fill orders at peak demand times. Once outside the cooperative, however, they
faced new harvesting challenges. Typically orders from French buyers would come in on a
Tuesday, and the producers would need to have twenty tonnes of cleaned fresh mussels
ready for Friday. Outside the cooperative, due to the limited supply of labour, the break-
away producers struggled to get large orders ready on time. Wage labour did not offer a
complete answer to their difficulty, as besides being expensive it has often proved hard to
get good quality workers at short notice. The breakaway producers were also at a disad-
vantage with their available equipment (Interview individual producer: 7/7/10). In re-
sponse to their predicament, three of the breakaway producers began to cooperate with
each other so as to secure a better share of the fresh mussel market.
These producers continue to harvest their own stock with their own equipment and
their own labour forces. It is at this point that they pool their harvests so as to fill large
orders. When mussels are sold in the fresh market they must first be removed from the
sea and laid on the shore at the mid-tide mark. The experience of being submerged in
the water and removed from it for a number of hours over a three-to-four day period,
allows the mussels to learn to close when they are out of the water and so retain their
freshness and prolong their shelf life. The producers must therefore harvest the mus-
sels, bag them and then unload the mussel bags from the boat and lay them on the
shore. Once the mussels learn to close, the mussel bags are then lifted on to pallets and
loaded onto a waiting truck (Observations and interviews, individual producers: 10/10/
10, 11/10/10 and 12/10/10).
As each of the mussel bags weighs up to forty kg and must be lifted out of the water
and carried up a wet and slippery pier, all this harvesting work is time consuming and
often backbreaking. With 500–600 bags to be moved, help is indispensable and the
realisation of this is what gives the three fresh mussel breakaway producers the
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shore or loaded onto pallets for sale. The expectation is that each individual takes an
equal share of the workload. As one of the producers, in reflecting on the willingness
to cooperate, observed:
Any problems with helping each other out? None at all, sure I know them lads for
years, can trust those lads, you know they are not going to try and get one up on
you (Individual producer: 11/10/09)
And, in due course, the proceeds of the sale are divided in proportion to the contri-
bution each individual has made to the shellfish consignment (Interviews and observa-
tions, 11/10/09, 3/12/09, 2/2/10 12/10/10). Cooperation between the three men has
been facilitated by the fact that they are all very close friends, having known each other
for a long number of years. The young local men they hire from time to time also know
the three producers well. The humour and banter, often observable during the working
day within the cooperative, has been reproduced outside it to a considerable degree.
By switching from the fresh to the processed mussel market, the other two breakaway
producers did not face the same time pressures as those selling fresh mussels. The busi-
ness plan the processed mussel farmers adopted was based on the assumptions that it
was more feasible to mechanise their operations and to concentrate on quantity rather
than quality (Interview individual producer: 8/8/10). In contrast, the three fresh mussel
breakaway farmers, each one young and newly married with mortgages to pay and
young families to support, did not find selling to the processed market attractive as the
prices were too low. Manus and one of the breakaway producers who have opted to sell
overwhelmingly into the processed market also make heavy use of cooperation and
family labour. Their experience, no less than the others, has been that cooperation and
the use of family labour are preferable to relying entirely on costly hired labour.Discussion and conclusions
We began with the suggestion that four sets of conditions have been seen in the litera-
ture as important to the survival chances of small-scale natural resource enterprises.
While each set of conditions has relevance in attempting to explore the survival pros-
pects of the Killary mussel farmers, we have paid particular attention in this paper to
exploring the contribution of ‘cooperation’. Before summing up what we have to say
about cooperation, we must first briefly assess the contribution of the other three sets
of conditions.
The first set of survival conditions identifies economic considerations as central.
Since north Connemara mussel farming did experience serious pressure to move to-
wards greater capitalization and larger scale in its second phase of development, the
question arises as to whether the pattern of small-scale aquaculture we have been de-
scribing is no more than a transitional stage. The critical issue here is whether the ten-
dency towards larger scale, already in train, will usher in a third phase of development
in which Manus or one or more of the breakaway producers (perhaps with a well-
capitalised external partner) attempts to double or treble their current farming opera-
tions. Were this to happen the domestic commodity production currently in place
would risk being overshadowed by a capitalist form of sea farming in which 'expanding
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1985: 15–19).
The possibility of Killary mussel farming assuming a fully capitalist form cannot be
entirely discounted, although there is no real indication of it becoming a reality in the
near term. The case of Manus comes closest even though his output appears to have
levelled off and, interestingly, he has now discontinued his earlier practice of hiring in
workers and become entirely reliant on supplementing his own labour with cooperative
and family labour. Although the breakaway producers have larger farms, substantially
greater output, make much more use of hired labour, and view themselves as farming
on a larger scale than the cooperative’s membership, they still insist on seeing them-
selves as relatively ‘small’ in size. Most critically, they do not see themselves as travel-
ling along a progressively expansionist growth path. The most telling indication of this
is the reluctance of any of the breakaway producers to commit themselves to full-time
mussel farming.
A related consideration is the view still taken locally of mussel farming as an enter-
prise and source of livelihood that can allow local people resist the economic pres-
sure to leave north Connemara in search of paid work elsewhere. Both inside and
outside of the cooperative, the principal expressed aim of mussel production is still
to use it as a means of ensuring that the sea farmers and their families have a future
in the area and will not be forced to migrate or emigrate. At the same time, it is very
clear that members of the cooperative and the breakaway producers do not see eye-
to-eye as to the level of mussel production required to secure an adequate livelihood
from sea farming.
The second set of survival conditions introduced at the outset revolves around the
household, and more particularly the deployment of household labour and the willing-
ness of household members to commit to do what is required of them to ensure house-
hold survival. The centrality of unpaid family labour to the survival struggles of the
breakaway mussel farmers has been highlighted in this ethnographic account. Indeed,
the significance of the labour family members - such as wives and brothers - have con-
tributed is a very pronounced feature of the second developmental phase of Killary
mussel farming. What this pattern further suggests is a major overlap between the set
of conditions that highlights the contribution of the household and the one that places
the emphasis on informal cooperation between friends, neighbours and relatives. Much
of the observable informal cooperation in the breakaway farmer group can be linked to
the household through marriage and kinship ties.
A third set of survival conditions focuses on the state’s importance in regulating and
stimulating small-scale enterprise. Over recent decades Irish state agencies have seen
aquaculture as one of the few sources of sustainable long-term employment, outside of
agriculture and tourism, for the spatially remote coastal communities of the west of
Ireland (Phyne 1996). And in the case of Killary shellfish aquaculture there can be no
doubt but that the state – in the guises of BIM, NBST and the CPA - was crucial to the
cooperative’s formation and early development. The stimulus provided by the state
mainly took the forms of grant assistance and the provision of expert advice relating to
mussel biology, business and marketing principles, and cooperative structures and op-
erating practices. Without such support it is highly unlikely that the cooperative would
either have appeared or put itself on a stable footing over time. Inexperience and lack
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and CPA message that organising as a cooperative would allow them to pool and share
costs, and in consequence significantly reduce them (Interview: Joe, former cooperative
member, 25/5/10).
Our discussion of cooperation, the fourth set of survival conditions introduced at the
outset, has focused both on the formally organised Killary Fish Farming Cooperative
and the informal cooperative ties that have developed among the breakaway producers
since 2000. Both the formal and informal forms of cooperation have involved the pool-
ing of savings, labour power, and access to markets. Normative expectations, pertaining
to trust and reciprocity between friends and neighbours in the wider society, have also
been pooled both within and outside the cooperative.
It has been shown that the cooperative was critical to the adoption of a distinctive
model of small-scale mussel farming, and to the survival prospects of the individual sea
farmers, during the Killary mussel farming industry’s first developmental phase. Co-
operation, by facilitating the sharing of knowledge, equipment, labour power, and mar-
kets among the members, came to be viewed early on not only as critical to the
survival chances of the individual mussel farmers but as synonymous with the small-
scale model of mussel farming itself.
Not alone did the actors themselves see the cooperative as central to their survival,
but the practice of cooperation actually succeeded very substantially in delivering on
survival. Very few producers fell by the wayside in the early years. Without the cooper-
ative’s support and assistance, it is highly unlikely that individual producers would have
either got going or survived in the industry.
Trust and the willingness to reciprocate were important normative elements of the
wider culture that influenced the individuals who formed the cooperative in the early
1980s. Within the cooperative, reciprocities based on trust were reproduced and be-
came one of its fundamental organising principles, features described by Ostrom (2010)
as essential for effective cooperation. Such a climate of trust was not universally found
throughout north Connemara aquaculture. In other shellfish-farming cooperative ven-
tures in the region, as Curtin (1993) shows, individuals, despite seeing clear economic
benefits, failed to cooperate effectively due to poor social relationships and a conse-
quent inability to draw upon and build feelings of trust.
Of course, the prospective Killary mussel farmers were simultaneously rational actors
who at first could see that they had little or no chance of getting going and surviving
on their own in the industry. If they were to get a foothold in the emerging mussel in-
dustry, they needed to cooperate; and they were willing to cooperate because of the
economic benefits that would likely accrue. Such rational cooperative behaviour reso-
nates with Menzies’ (1993) study of small-scale fishing in British Columbia, where local
fisher families were ready to share resources among themselves in order to sustain their
livelihoods.
Another of the cooperative’s normative foundations was the equalitarian desire,
institutionalised in the four-hectare size rule, that all members should enjoy equal access
to Killary’s mussel-farming water. That the four-hectare rule was and remains strong
within the cooperative did not save it from being challenged by those members who by
2000 viewed it as inimical to their own individual interests. Loyalty to the cooperative, to
its reciprocities and to the equalitarian impulse that contributed to its identity, proved
Cush and Varley Maritime Studies 2013, 12:11 Page 16 of 17
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/12/1/11therefore to be contingent rather than absolute among those producers who broke away
to follow a go-it-alone pathway in 2000.
Why this breach occurred was not simply a matter of rational man’s propensity for
egoistic individualism trumping notions of social solidarity in the abstract. Instead, it
can be related to social circumstances in the cases of three of the five breakaway pro-
ducers, each one young and newly married, with mortgages to pay off and young fam-
ilies to support.
The ethnographic account also makes clear that the breakaway producers have not
turned their backs on cooperation in the informal sense. On the contrary, the five
breakaway members still rely on informal forms of cooperation and it is difficult to see
how they could survive without doing so. We have seen how three of them, each one
producing mussels for the fresh market, have come to cooperate together in order to
compensate for their individual inadequacies at times when large consignments of mus-
sels have to be assembled at short notice for French buyers. The other two breakaway
farmers, by opting to produce for the processed mussel market, find themselves rela-
tively less pressured. They too, however, rely on the cooperation they receive from fam-
ily members to run their businesses effectively.
Despite the rise of forces that favour egoistic individualism in Celtic Tiger Ireland
(Kirby 2005), we do not see the demise of cooperation in Killary Harbour as imminent,
although informal cooperation has significantly eclipsed formal cooperation in the case
study site. Both formal and informal forms of cooperation continue to endure and each
has made a highly significant contribution to enabling small-scale mussel farming to
survive.
Such a conclusion is of more general significance given that small-scale production
remains a prominent feature of Irish aquaculture, especially in the case of rope
mussel cultivation. In recent years Bantry Bay Seafoods, which has operated grow-
out sites in the southern county of Cork producing 4,500 tonnes of mussels, has been
the major exception here (Phyne 2009: 186). Set against the sort of concentration
represented by Bantry Bay Seafoods, figures provided by PricewaterhouseCoopers
suggest that 59 mussel farmers were producing 8,755 tonnes of mussels (fresh and
processed) in 2004; and that 55 of these harvested fewer than 500 tonnes per year
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2006). Such figures indicate that much Irish mussel pro-
duction is spread out among a large number of relatively small sea farmers, even if
significant concentration has become pronounced in Donegal (bottom mussels) and
in Cork (rope mussels) (Phyne 2009).
Yet, despite the pattern that these figures point to, little is known about the strategies
that small-scale mussel farmers have devised in order to survive. This is where ethno-
graphic accounts can be of use in allowing us to explore the range of relevant factors
that sustain this branch of small-scale aquaculture. By no means is it being suggested
here that both the formal and informal types of cooperation are the only factors at
work in promoting small-scale aquaculture’s survival, but by using an ethnographic
approach it is nonetheless possible to make a strong case for their critical importance
in the Killary site.
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